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UNDERCOVER INVESTIGATIONS AND GOVERNMENT LAWYERS 
Eric B. Estes* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 “[N]o sooner is one fraud specifically defined and outlawed that another 
variant of it appears.”1 
It is difficult to root out fraud. The Office of the Attorney General, as 
well as numerous other agencies of the State of Arkansas, is, nonetheless, 
obligated to undertake this effort.2 In the case of the Consumer Protection 
Division, the Attorney General has been charged with the power and duty 
“[t]o conduct investigations, research, studies, and analyses of matters, to 
issue reports, and take appropriate action affecting the interests of consum-
ers,” and the Office employs various methods to achieve these goals.3 Be-
cause even the most unscrupulous of shysters would be hesitant to directly 
implicate himself in fraud to a government official, the Office of the Arkan-
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also responsible for lobbying efforts and governmental relations for the company, as well as 
litigation oversight. 
  Prior to joining Xcaliber, Eric spent 15 years with the Office of the Arkansas Attor-
ney, including 10 years as the Senior Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office’s 
Tobacco Litigation and Enforcement Division. In this capacity, he served as the staff contact 
for Attorney General Dustin McDaniel during his tenure as Tobacco Co-Chair of the NAAG 
Tobacco Committee. He further assisted in the settlement of the “diligent enforcement” arbi-
tration, a dispute under the tobacco Master Settlement Agreement that could have, without 
settlement, negatively impacted billions of dollars in state revenue. During his time at the 
Office of the Arkansas Attorney General, Eric also practiced in the Attorney General’s con-
sumer, environmental, and utility divisions and assisted with various legislative efforts. 
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in the preparation of this article for publication. 
 1. Commonwealth v. Monumental Props., Inc., 329 A.2d 812, 826 (Pa. 1974). 
 2. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-105(d)(3) (2013). The list of Arkansas agencies, boards, 
and commissions that root out fraud and illegal activity is quite long and includes such organ-
izations as the Arkansas Livestock and Poultry Commission, State Plant Board, Arkansas 
Bureau of Standards, Arkansas Tobacco Control, Department of Human Services, Depart-
ment of Health, and Workers’ Compensation Commission. Police agencies and prosecuting 
attorneys have similar responsibilities in the criminal realm. 
 3. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-105(d)(3) (2013). See id. at § 4-88-105(b) (vesting in the 
attorney general the power to “appoint such assistants, investigators, and professional and 
clerical staff as are necessary for the efficient operation of the division.”). 
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sas Attorney General has often engaged in the use of undercover investiga-
tions to obtain evidence and determine the scope of deceptive activities. 
In addition to its lawyers, the Consumer Protection Division also em-
ploys a number of investigators. In many cases, these investigators assist 
consumers in the mediation of complaints. In other situations, however, in-
vestigators have used undercover identities, computers, addresses, telephone 
numbers, and credit cards to engage with those who are implicated in fraud-
ulent activities directed towards Arkansas consumers.4 In both situations, the 
investigators work closely with and under the supervision of staff attorneys.5 
Attorneys General across the nation have historically operated under 
the premise that, as law enforcement agencies, they had the authority to en-
gage, within lawful and ethical constraints, with those committing deception 
within their borders. As noted by the National Association of Attorneys 
General (“NAAG”) within a 2008 communication to its members, there is 
an existing “right of law enforcement officials to practice deception in un-
dercover operations,” citing Lewis v. United States.6 A question has now 
been raised as to whether this allowance exists only for police agencies or 
whether it also extends to their lawyers. 
There is little doubt that the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct 
(“Rules”) apply to all lawyers, including those who work for governmental 
agencies.7 Indeed, the application of the Rules to government lawyers has 
been made clear by the courts of this State. In Holloway v. Ark. State Bd. of 
Architects,8 for instance, the Court of Appeals held that “as a lawyer and 
officer of the court, the Attorney General is subject to the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.”9 The question of whether the Rules apply in a blan-
 
 4. To date, no such opinion has focused on whether it is ethical for government lawyers 
to permit the use of ruse during the course of consumer investigations. Despite this, at least 
one court has discussed the use of pseudonyms by civil investigators working for state attor-
neys general. See, e.g., Brown v. Spitzer Ford, Inc., No. 37802, 1978 WL 218210, at *3–4 
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 7, 1978). In that case, the Ohio Court of Appeals determined that activi-
ties undertaken by investigators were “consumer transactions” for the purpose of determining 
whether a statutory violation had occurred. Id. at *5. 
 5. Pursuant to the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct, supervisory attorneys are 
responsible for assuring that non-lawyer staff members abide by applicable ethical standards. 
See ARK. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2014). 
 6. Chris Toth, Don’t Be Deceived. It’s Not a Simple Matter: The Use of Deception by 
Law Enforcement Attorneys and Rule 8.4(c), NAAGAZETTE, Feb. 29, 2009, at 4, available at 
http://www.naag.org/publications/naagazette/volume-2-number-3/nt-be-deceived-its-not-a-
simple-matter-the-use-of-deception-by-law-enforcement-attorneys-and-rule-8.php, (summa-
rizing the effect of the ruling in Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966)). 
 7. See ARK. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. n.18 (2005). 
 8. 79 Ark. App. 200, 86 S.W.3d 391 (2002). 
 9. Holloway v. Ark. State Bd. of Architects, 79 Ark. App. 200, 214, 86 S.W.3d 391, 
400 (2002), rev’d on other grounds, 352 Ark. 427, 101 S.W.3d 805 (2003). The Arkansas 
Court of Appeals has recognized, however, that there is “a need for adaptation of the ethics 
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ket fashion, however, has not been fully considered by either the courts of 
Arkansas or the Office on Professional Conduct. 
Honesty is one of many issues addressed by the Rules. On the topic of 
candor, the Rules provide, “[i]n the course of representing a client a lawyer 
shall not knowingly: . . . make a false statement of material fact . . . to a 
third person.”10 The Rules further provide “[i]t is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to: . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation.”11 While in theory these concepts reinforce long-held 
beliefs that “honesty is the best policy,” they sometimes work detriment. 
In many situations, the government lawyer’s best means of obtaining 
evidence is to engage, either directly or indirectly, in deception. In most 
cases, this is a fact-specific inquiry, limited in scope and grounded in com-
mon sense. For example, in March 2011, the Attorney General entered into a 
Consent Decree with an individual that had violated various federal and 
state laws relating to credit repair services and deception.12 Among the ques-
tions at issue was whether the individual could advertise and solicit business 
without disclosing that truthful, but negative, credit data could not be delet-
ed from a consumer’s credit history.13 Only five months after the case was 
settled and the individual was enjoined from future credit repair activities, a 
consumer, who wished to remain anonymous, indicated that that the indi-
vidual was again offering credit repair services via the social networking site 
Facebook. 
The easiest and most direct means of obtaining evidence supporting the 
allegation would have been to access the enjoined party’s Facebook page. 
This action, however, would have required that an employee of the Office of 
the Attorney General send that individual a “friend” request in order to ob-
tain such access. Traditionally, this would have been done by the use of an 
undercover identification, so as to obtain necessary documentation without 
giving an opposing litigant access to personal information that is normally 
associated with social networking.14 Due to recent concerns associated with 
 
rules in the Model Rules to the Attorney General and his staff in recognition of the unique-
ness of the office, . . . [as well as] the Attorney General’s statutory obligation to protect the 
public interest.” Id. at 216, 86 S.W.3d 400. 
 10. ARK. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a) (2014). 
 11. Id. at R. 8.4(c) (2005). 
 12. State of Arkansas v. Matt Seibert, No. 4:09-CV-960-SWW (E.D. Ark filed Dec. 29, 
2009). 
 13. See id. at 3–4. 
 14. The information typically available on social networking sites involves such things 
as hometown, employment history, relationship status, family information, political views, 
and religious affiliations. This information is not of the sort that is traditionally viewed as 
“public” and that would be disclosed to strangers or adverse parties. 
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the use of undercover identities and the Rules, however, such a decision was 
scuttled.15 
Decisions related to the use of deception by government officials to ob-
tain evidence can be broadly divided into three categories: criminal cases, 
civil cases, and disciplinary cases. Each of these categories will be examined 
in turn, followed by a look at various approaches to the ethical questions 
surrounding the use of undercover work by attorneys. Examining each of 
these categories in turn followed by a look at various approaches to the ethi-
cal questions surrounding the use of undercover work by attorneys, this arti-
cle posits that Arkansas has yet to announce a position with regard to the use 
of deceptive tactics or misrepresentation when such tactics are nearly the 
only available means of obtaining evidence necessary to a legal proceeding. 
Because of the importance of such information and the limited avenues 
through which it can be garnered, Arkansas should follow those states that 
have clarified their approach allowing these practices to continue in limited 
circumstances. 
II. CRIMINAL CASES  
“There are some situations where the law could not adequately be enforced 
without the employment of some guile or misrepresentation of identity.”16 
In 1966, the Supreme Court of the United States twice addressed the 
use of government subterfuge in criminal investigations. In both cases, the 
use of deceit as a tool for fighting crime was approved. Hoffa v. United 
States17 involved the use of a government informer as a means to obtain evi-
dence for a federal jury tampering investigation that lead to the conviction 
of famed union leader Jimmy Hoffa.18 It was alleged that the government 
informant was, as a result of government payments and reduced charges 
against him, biased and therefore less likely to be truthful.19 It was further 
alleged that, a result of these deficiencies, the government had violated Hof-
fa’s constitutional rights, including those under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendments.20 The Supreme Court of the United States disagreed, finding 
that the use of government informants was not per se unconstitutional.21 In 
doing so, however, the court cautioned law enforcement officials about the 
 
 15. Ultimately, the anonymous consumer provided “screen shots” that permitted the 
Arkansas Attorney General to move forward with a Motion to Show Cause. 
 16. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 315 (1966) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 
 17. 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
 18. Id. at 293–95 (majority opinion). 
 19. See id. at 298, 310–12. 
 20. See id. at 300–12. 
 21. Id. at 310–12. 
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use of such subterfuge, stating: “[t]his is not to say that a secret government 
informer is to the slightest degree more free from all relevant constitutional 
restrictions than is any other government agent.”22 
Chief Justice Earl Warren dissented from the opinion of the court in 
Hoffa asserting that, under the facts presented, the government was over-
zealous.23 Notwithstanding this fact-specific inquiry, Chief Justice Warren 
agreed that the use of government deceit was not, in all cases, impermissi-
ble: 
At this late date in the annals of law enforcement, it seems to me that we 
cannot say either that every use of informers and undercover agents is 
proper or, on the other hand, that no uses are. There are some situations 
where the law could not adequately be enforced without the employment 
of some guile or misrepresentation of identity. A law enforcement officer 
performing his official duties cannot be required always to be in uniform 
or to wear his badge of authority on the lapel of his civilian clothing. Nor 
need he be required in all situations to proclaim himself an arm of the 
law. It blinks the realities of sophisticated, modern-day criminal activity 
and legitimate law enforcement practices to argue the contrary.24 
Consistent with this theory, the Supreme of the United States went on 
to affirm the use of undercover work by government officials in Lewis v. 
United States.25 In doing so, the court stated: “it has long been acknowl-
edged by the decisions of this Court . . . that, in the detection of many types 
of crime, the Government is entitled to use decoys and to conceal the identi-
ty of its agents.”26 
Courts from across the nation have followed this lead. In United States 
v. Carona,27 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit exam-
ined, in part, the ethical implications of using an undercover agent to com-
municate with the target of an investigation who was represented by coun-
sel.28 Here, the undercover agent “was acting at the direction of the prosecu-
tor.”29 Like the court in Hoffa, the Ninth Circuit refused to adopt a categori-
cal rule of universal application, instead electing to examine, on a case-by-
case basis, those matters involving the use of governmental deceit.30 The 
court ultimately concluded that the prosecutor had not violated state ethical 
 
 22. Id. at 311. 
 23. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 320–21 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 
 24. Id. at 315. 
 25. 385 U.S. 206, 212 (1966). 
 26. Id. at 208–09 (citations omitted). 
 27. 630 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 921. 
 30. Id. 
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rules by using a ruse to communicate with a represented party.31 “[I]t has 
long been established that the government may use deception in its investi-
gations in order to induce suspects into making incriminating statements.”32 
In the mind of a practitioner, communications with represented parties 
appear to be more ethically questionable than the mere use of a ruse. Indeed, 
the no-contact provision of the Rules, and the model rules on which they 
were based, recognize that: 
This Rule contributes to the proper functioning of the legal system by 
protecting a person who has chosen to be represented by a lawyer in a 
matter against possible overreaching by other lawyers who are participat-
ing in the matter, interference by those lawyers with the client-lawyer re-
lationship and the uncounselled disclosure of information relating to the 
representation.33 
At least in the criminal context, however, the Carona court determined 
that “[i]t would be antithetical to the administration of justice to allow a 
wrongdoer to immunize himself against such undercover operations simply 
by letting it be known that he has retained counsel.”34 The Ninth Circuit did 
not even bother itself with a discussion of whether the use of an undercover 
agent was a “misrepresentation” within the meaning of other ethical rules. 
Despite the prevalence of cases determining that pre-indictment con-
tacts with represented parties are permitted in criminal investigations, the 
American Bar Association (ABA) has issued an opinion questioning the 
practice.35 Opinion 95-396 was issued in July 1995 to address attorney 
communications with represented parties under the no-contact provisions of 
Rule 4.2 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.36 The opinion sharply 
criticizes those courts holding that pre-indictment contacts are permitted, 
while recognizing that the decisions remain binding precedent.37 As part of 
its analysis, the ABA stated: “Although there have been holdings to the con-
trary, the Committee [on Ethics and Professional Responsibility] believes it 
is clear that Rule 4.2 applies to the conduct of lawyers in criminal as well as 
civil matters, including both federal and state prosecutors.”38 It explained 
that, while this may limit government investigations into wrongdoing, “the 
search for truth is not the only value to which lawyers, including govern-
 
 31. Id. at 922. 
 32. Id. 
 33. ARK. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 1 (2014). 
 34. Carona, 630 F.3d at 922. 
 35. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995). 
 36. Id. 
 37. See generally id. 
 38. Id. at 4. 
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ment lawyers, must respond.”39 In their concurrence, two members of the 
Committee advocated further review of this issue by the courts, with hopes 
that later opinions would conclude that lawyers are prohibited from even 
pre-indictment contacts with an accused.40 
Opinion 95-396 did not directly address the use of ruses by investiga-
tors who are under the supervision of attorneys. The ABA did, however, 
appear to conclude that “[t]here is no doubt that the use of investigators in 
civil and criminal matters is normal and proper. Particularly in the criminal 
context, there are legitimate reasons not only for the use of undercover 
agents to conduct investigations, but for lawyers to supervise the acts of 
those agents.”41 It is unclear how this statement comports with Opinion 95-
396 as a whole. In one respect, the ABA appears to give literal effect to Rule 
4.2 and the prohibition of contacts with represented parties in both the civil 
and criminal context, despite the fact that the application of the Rule, per its 
admission, “can be an obstacle to investigation.”42 The ABA, nonetheless, 
appears, in dicta, to condone misrepresentations by investigators, despite the 
plain provisions of Rules 4.1 and 8.4.43 
Those courts that have examined whether government attorneys may 
supervise criminal investigations that employ deceit have generally deter-
mined such practices to be non-violative of ethical rules. In United States v. 
Parker,44 criminal defendants asserted, in part, that the use of confidential 
sources by government attorneys to gather evidence was deceptive within 
the meaning of applicable ethical rules and that evidence obtained through 
these methods should be suppressed.45 The court disagreed with these con-
tentions, citing traditional public safety considerations: “Defendant’s logic 
would, if accepted, mean that government attorneys could not supervise 
investigations involving undercover agents and informants who cannot re-
veal their true identity and purpose to the targets of the investigation without 
thereby rendering the investigation futile and dangerous. There is no au-
thority for such a conclusion.”46 This logic is clearly correct. As noted by 
leading treatise writers, “a rule forbidding a lawyer’s involvement while 
continuing to allow undercover operations operates to prevent lawyers from 
serving as a brake or restraint on over-zealous undercover operations by lay-
 
 39. Id. at 10. 
 40. Id. at 22. 
 41. Formal Op. 95-396, supra note 35, at 18. 
 42. Id. at 10. 
 43. Id. at 18–19. 
 44. 165 F. Supp. 2d 431 (W.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 476–77. 
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investigators.”47 From a societal point-of-view, it is this result that should be 
disfavored. 
Although the majority of courts have determined that the use of under-
cover investigations in the criminal context is not unethical, there are limits 
on an attorney’s use of such ploys. Perhaps the biggest limitation is candor 
to the tribunal. People v. Reichman involved a prosecutor’s use of the court 
system to protect the credibility of a government informant.48 The actions 
involved an arrest, the filing of sham criminal charges, and the introduction 
of false testimony.49 In all cases, the court was unaware that a ruse was tak-
ing place.50 Although the court recognized that undercover operations were 
not per se unethical, it was unwilling to look past public safety objectives 
under the facts of the case.51 In sanctioning the prosecutor, the court con-
cluded: 
The respondent’s responsibility to enforce the laws in his judicial district 
grants him no license to ignore those laws or the Code of Professional 
Responsibility. While the respondent’s motives and the erroneous belief 
of other public prosecutors that the respondent’s conduct was ethical do 
not excuse these violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 
they are mitigating factors to be taken into account in assessing the ap-
propriate discipline.52 
Based upon the ruling in Reichman, it is likely permissible for prosecu-
tors to engage in and even direct undercover operations. It is, however, un-
wise to involve a court in these efforts without its knowledge and permis-
sion. 
III. CIVIL CASES  
“The prevailing understanding in the legal profession is that a public or pri-
vate lawyer’s use of an undercover investigator to detect ongoing violations 
of the law is not ethically proscribed, especially where it would be difficult 
to discover the violations by other means.”53 
The use of undercover investigations in civil litigation has, also, with 
limited exception, been approved. Early cases espousing the use of under-
 
 47. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER’S 
DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 4.2-1(b) n.14 (2007–2008). 
 48. 819 P.2d 1035 (Colo. 1991). 
 49. Id. at 1036–37. 
 50. Id. at 1037. 
 51. Id. at 1039. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Apple Corps, Ltd. v. Int’l Collectors Soc’y, 15 F.Supp.2d 456, 475 (D.N.J. 1998). 
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cover work involved the use of “checkers” or “testers” in discrimination 
cases.54 One example of such a case is Richardson v. Howard,55 which fo-
cused on whether courts should discredit a discrimination tester’s credibility 
based upon material, but necessary, misrepresentations.56 The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded that the actions of the 
tester, while deceitful, did not affect the witness’ credibility: 
This court and others have repeatedly approved and sanctioned the role 
of “testers” in racial discrimination cases. It is frequently difficult to de-
velop proof in discrimination cases and the evidence provided by testers 
is frequently valuable, if not indispensable. It is surely regrettable that 
testers must mislead commercial landlords and home owners as to their 
real intentions to rent or buy housing. Nonetheless, we have long recog-
nized that this requirement of deception was a relatively small price to 
pay to defeat racial discrimination.57 
The court further stated: “We have discovered no case in which the 
credibility of testimony provided by a tester has been questioned simply 
because of the tester’s ‘professional’ status.”58 No mention was made as to 
whether the use of testers in discrimination cases was ethical, even though 
the tester was employed by the same agency as the attorney representing the 
plaintiff.59 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit made 
similar findings in Hamilton v. Miller,60 determining that the use of a tester 
was necessary, despite false pretense.61 
Civil investigators have also been used in cases involving copyright 
and trademark infringement.62 The leading and perhaps most frequently cit-
ed case on this topic is Apple Corps Ltd. v. International Collectors Socie-
ty.63 Apple Corps Ltd. was a trademark case involving the unauthorized 
 
 54. As explained by the Supreme Court of the United States, “‘testers’ are individuals 
who, without an intent to rent or purchase a home or apartment, pose as renters or purchasers 
for the purpose of collecting evidence of unlawful steering practices.” Havens Realty Corp. v. 
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373 (1982). Testers are also frequently used in employment discrim-
ination cases. See Michael J. Yelnosky, Filling an Enforcement Void: Using Testers to Un-
cover and Remedy Discrimination in Hiring for Lower-Skilled, Entry-Level Jobs, 26 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 403, 404–06. 
 55. 712 F.2d 319 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 321 (citations omitted). 
 58. Id. at 321–22. 
 59. Id. 
 60. 477 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1973). 
 61. Id. 
 62. See Apple Corps Ltd. v. International Collectors Society, 15 F. Supp. 2d 456 (D.N.J. 
1998). 
 63. 15 F. Supp. 2d 456 (D.N.J. 1998). 
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manufacture and marketing of merchandise depicting The Beatles.64 The 
plaintiffs had previously obtained an injunction to prevent the use of their 
likenesses for commercial gain.65 The case arose out of subsequent attempts 
by the plaintiffs to purchase merchandise from the defendant in order to 
determine whether a breach of the injunctive relief had occurred.66 All of the 
attempted telephone purchases occurred by those associated with the plain-
tiffs or their law firms.67 After selling various merchandise, the defendants 
objected to the use of misrepresentations to test compliance and alleged at-
torney misconduct.68 
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey disa-
greed that the tactics employed by the plaintiffs and their lawyers were vio-
lative of applicable ethical rules: 
This limited use of deception, to learn about ongoing acts of wrongdo-
ing, is also accepted outside the area of criminal or civil-rights law en-
forcement. The prevailing understanding in the legal profession is that a 
public or private lawyer’s use of an undercover investigator to detect on-
going violations of the law is not ethically proscribed, especially where it 
would be difficult to discover the violations by other means.69 
The lead set by Apple Corps Ltd. has been followed repeatedly by civil 
courts.70 
In Gidatex, S.r.L. v. Campaniello Imps., Ltd.,71 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York also examined the use of 
civil investigators employed by attorneys in a trademark infringement case.72 
As outlined by the court, the purpose of New York’s version of Model Rule 
4.1 was to “protect parties from being tricked into making statements in the 
absence of their counsel and to protect clients from misrepresentations by 
 
 64. Id. at 458. 
 65. Id. at 458–59. Coincidently, in 1963, the Beatles recorded a cover of the song “Mon-
ey (That’s What I Want).” In stark contrast, John Lennon recorded “Imagine” in 1971 with 
the following lyrics: “Imagine no possessions. I wonder if you can.” 
 66. Id. at 462–64. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Apple Corps Ltd., 15 F. Supp. 2d at 472–76. 
 69. Id. at 475 (citations omitted). 
 70. See, e.g., Chloe v. DesignersImports.com USA, Inc., No. 07–CV–1791 (CS)(GAY), 
2009 WL 1227927, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2009) (determining that the use of a pseudo-
nym did not effect the credibility of a witness); Cartier v. Symbolix, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 2d 
354, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (recognizing the decisions of other courts that permitted the use of 
undercover investigators); Gidatex, S.r.L. v. Campaniello Imports, Ltd., 82 F. Supp. 2d 119, 
122–24 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that the use of undercover investigators was not an ethical 
violation). 
 71. 82 F. Supp. 2d 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 72. Id. at 120. 
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their own attorneys.”73 Despite the intent of this provision, the court deter-
mined that the use of undercover investigators in civil cases was not neces-
sarily prohibited by ethical rules: 
These ethical rules should not govern situations where a party is legiti-
mately investigating potential unfair business practices by use of an un-
dercover posing as a member of the general public engaging in ordinary 
business transactions with the target. To prevent this use of investigators 
might permit targets to freely engage in unfair business practices which 
are harmful to both trademark owners and consumers in general.74 
Ultimately, “undercover investigators provide an effective enforcement 
mechanism for detecting and proving anti-competitive activity which might 
otherwise escape discovery or proof.”75 
Despite the rulings in Apple Corps Ltd. and Gidatex, S.r.L., not all 
courts are willing to permit attorney involvement in civil investigations. For 
example, in Allen v. Int’l Truck & Engine,76 the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of Indiana addressed attorney oversight of a civil 
investigation into allegations of racial discrimination.77 During the course of 
the investigation, investigators made contact with multiple plaintiffs and 
potential class members.78 As part of its inquiry, the United States District 
Court discounted multiple decisions relating to the use of civil investigators, 
including cases similar to Apple Corps Ltd. and Gidatex, S.r.L.79 The court 
further discounted the application of opinions from various sources on the 
subject, including opinions issued by the ABA.80 Ultimately, Allen appears 
to hold that attorneys may not be actively involved in an investigation that 
results in contact with a represented party.81 This decision appears to stand 
in stark contrast to holdings in criminal cases, which allow attorney in-
volvement in investigations, even where contacts with an accused may oc-
cur.82 
A similar decision was reached by the United States District Court for 
the District of South Dakota in Midwest Motor Sports, Inc. v. Arctic Cat 
 
 73. Id. at 122. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 124. 
 76. 2006 WL 2578896 (S.D. Ind. 2006). 
 77. See, e.g., id. 
 78. Id. at *2–3. 
 79. Id. at *7–8. 
 80. Id. at *8. The accused attorneys cited to ABA Op. 95-396 for the premise that inves-
tigators are commonly used in civil and criminal matters. Op. 95-396 is discussed in greater 
detail supra. 
 81. Id. at *6–9. 
 82. See, e.g., Carona, 630 F.3d at 922. 
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Sales, Inc.83 Midwest Motor Sports, Inc. involved the use of an undercover 
investigator to audiotape others in anticipation of trial; in all cases, the in-
vestigator masqueraded as a disinterested consumer while interviewing em-
ployees of the defendant.84 Per the decision of the court, the conduct under-
taken by the lawyer through the investigator was not permitted and was, 
accordingly, deemed unethical under the South Dakota Rules of Profession-
al Conduct.85 In this case, it was impermissible for an attorney to use an in-
vestigator to conduct clandestine activities with an employee of a represent-
ed litigant.86 Although the court recognized the holding in Apple Corps, Ltd., 
it ultimately concluded that “South Dakota law is crucially different.”87 The 
attorneys who used the investigator were ultimately punished through evi-
dentiary sanctions, as opposed to ethical sanctions.88 The court, however, 
warned others in the community: “The sanctions in this case were relatively 
light because some aspects of the law were unclear. If counsel practicing 
before this Court commit similar ethical violations in the future . . . the sanc-
tions imposed will not be so lenient.”89 
The dichotomy in decisions between Apple Corps, Inc. and Midwest 
Motors Sports, Inc. was later recognized by the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois. In Hill v. Shell Oil Co.,90 the defendant 
sought to prohibit the plaintiff’s attorney from using investigators to vide-
otape consumer transactions in which they engaged with the defendant and 
its retailers.91 Recognizing the split in authority, the Court stated: 
[W]e think there is a discernible continuum in the cases from clearly im-
permissible to clearly permissible conduct. Lawyers (and investigators) 
cannot trick protected employees into doing things or saying things they 
otherwise would not do or say. They cannot normally interview protect-
ed employees or ask them to fill out questionnaires. They probably can 
employ persons to play the role of customers seeking services on the 
same basis as the general public. They can videotape protected employ-
ees going about their activities in what those employees believe is the 
normal course.92 
Ultimately, the court punted and pushed a decision on the merits of the 
conduct to a later date, deciding that “[t]o the extent that employees and 
 
 83. 144 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (D. S.D. 2001). 
 84. Id. at 1150–53. 
 85. Id. at 1157–58. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 1158. 
 88. Id. at 1159–60. 
 89. Midwest Motor Sports Inc., 144 F. Supp. 2d 1160. 
 90. 209 F. Supp. 2d 876 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 880. 
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plaintiffs have substantive conversations outside of normal business transac-
tions, we will consider whether to bar that evidence when and if it is offered 
at trial.”93 Little was communicated to the legal community as to whether 
similar conduct would be deemed unethical in the future. 
IV. DISCIPLINARY CASES  
“Faithful adherence to the wording of [the Rules of Professional Conduct] 
and this court’s case law does not permit recognition of an exception for any 
lawyer to engage in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or false 
statements.”94 
Despite the prevalence of decisions in both the criminal and civil con-
text approving of deception by lawyers and their investigators as a means of 
evidence gathering, a number of courts, at least in the disciplinary setting, 
have been less forgiving. In the case of In re Gatti,95 the Supreme Court of 
Oregon considered the ethical implications of an attorney’s use of deception 
to gather evidence in support of a lawsuit.96 As outlined by the court, the 
attorney, who was a private practitioner, represented to others that he was a 
chiropractor in order to gather evidence in a fraud case against insurance 
providers.97 According to evidence presented at trial, the attorney had acted 
in reliance of an opinion by the Oregon State Bar that sanctioned the use of 
deceit by government attorneys in a case also involving fraud.98 The United 
States Attorney and Attorney General of Oregon appeared as amicus curiae, 
advocating an interpretation of the ethical rules that permitted the use of 
deceit by government lawyers in the pursuit of legitimate law enforcement 
activities.99 
Citing various authority, the accused attorney and government attor-
neys advocated a decision permitting the use of deception, “assert[ing] that 
public policy favors an exception that, at the least, allows investigators and 
discrimination testers to misrepresent their identity and purpose when they 
are investigating persons who are suspected of engaging in unlawful con-
duct.”100 The court disagreed, eviscerating the holding of criminal and civil 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. In re Conduct of Gatti, 8 P.3d 966, 976 (Ore. 2000) (emphasis in original). 
 95. 8 P.3d 966 (Ore. 2000). 
 96. See In re Conduct of Gatti, 8 P.3d 966 (Ore. 2000). 
 97. Id. at 969–72. 
 98. Id. at 972–73. 
 99. Id. at 974–75. 
 100. Id.at 975. See David B. Isbell & Lucantonio N. Salvi, Ethical Responsibility of Law-
yers for Deception by Undercover Investigators and Discrimination Testers: An Analysis of 
the Provisions Prohibiting Misrepresentation Under the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 791 (1995). Similar articles have also been published. See Tory 
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cases that permitted the use of undercover investigations by lawyers or their 
investigators. In doing so, the court stated: 
As members of the Bar ourselves—some of whom have prior experience 
as government lawyers and some of whom have prior experience in pri-
vate practice—this court is aware that there are circumstances in which 
misrepresentations, often in the form of false statements of fact by those 
who investigate violations of the law, are useful means for uncovering 
unlawful and unfair practices, and that lawyers in both the public and 
private sectors have relied on such tactics. However, ORS 9.490(1) pro-
vides that the rules of professional conduct “shall be binding on all 
members of the bar.” Faithful adherence to the wording of [these rules], 
and this court’s case law does not permit recognition of an exception for 
any lawyer to engage in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or 
false statements.101  
It was ultimately concluded that “[b]y misrepresenting his identity and 
purpose and making other false statements [in his interactions with others] 
with the intention of deceiving them, the accused violated his duty to the 
public to maintain personal integrity.”102 
In 2002, the Supreme Court of Colorado issued a decision substantially 
similar to Gatti in In re Paulter.103 In this case, the attorney, a state prosecu-
tor, had deceived a murder suspect into thinking that he was a public de-
fender in order to facilitate the suspect’s surrender.104 In addressing this de-
ceit, the court noted that Rule 8.4 and its commentary “are devoid of any 
exception.”105 It was further noted that the rules of professional conduct fail 
to “distinguish lawyers working in law enforcement from other lawyers.”106 
Although the prosecutor asserted that his actions were intended to protect 
the public from the threat of imminent public harm, the court was unsympa-
thetic: 
[W]e are adamant that when presented with choices, at least one of 
which conforms to the Rules, an attorney must not select an option that 
involves deceit or misrepresentation. The level of ethical standards to 
which our profession holds all attorneys, especially prosecutors, leaves 
 
L. Lucas, To Catch a Criminal, to Cleanse a Profession: Exposing Deceptive Practices by 
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 101. In re Conduct of Gatti, 8 P.3d at 976. 
 102. Id. at 977. 
 103. In re Paulter, 47 P.3d 1175 (Colo. 2002). 
 104. Id. at 1177. 
 105. Id. at 1179. 
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no room for deceiving [others]. . . . [The attorney] cannot compromise 
his integrity, and that of our profession, irrespective of the cause.107  
Apparently, in the practice of law, an attorney cannot serve two mas-
ters. “The obligations concomitant with a license to practice law trump [oth-
er] obligations concomitant with a lawyer’s other duties, even apprehending 
criminals.”108 
Despite the apparent breadth of Gatti and Paulter, at least one court has 
been willing to draw a distinction between deception by government law-
yers and those in private practice.109 In In re Crossen,110 a judge from the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts examined the use of an elaborate 
ruse by a private lawyer to establish that a trial court judge was biased 
against his client.111 At the heart of the ruse was a sham job interview with 
the judge’s clerk that was meant to obtain evidence about the personal and 
professional character of the judge.112 The attorney asserted that his use of 
deceit was justified and pointed to one of the secondary authorities dis-
cussed in footnote ninety-three in support of his arguments.113 
In addressing these claims, the judge, acting on behalf of the Supreme 
Judicial Court, was willing to make certain distinctions.114 The judge first 
made limited distinctions between elementary ruses, such as those involving 
identity, and those that were more elaborate and involved misrepresentations 
of a “graver kind.”115 The judge also recognized that certain behaviors could 
be justified by government attorneys, but not private practitioners.116 As part 
of this analysis, the judge stated: 
The crucial factor distinguishing government and private practitioners is 
the lack of oversight for the latter. Whatever leeway government attor-
neys are permitted in conducting investigations, they are subject not only 
to ethical constraints, but also to supervisory oversight and constitutional 
limits on what they may and may not do, constraints that do not apply to 
private attorneys representing private clients.117  
The judge continued: 
 
 107. Id. at 1880–81. 
 108. Id. at 1182. 
 109. In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d 352, (Mass. 2008). 
 110. 880 N.E.2d 352 (Mass. 2008). 
 111. Id. at 356–58. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 376–77. 
 114. See generally id. at 377–78. 
 115. Id. at 377 (citing Isbell & Salvi, supra note 93). While the judge was willing to 
recognize this distinction for the sake of argument, no ruling was made as to whether so-
called elementary ruses would fall outside the scope of the ethical rules. 
 116. In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d 378. 
 117. Id. 
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Constraints on government agents ensure that even undercover investiga-
tions conducted by government attorneys are reined in by the stringent 
constitutional requirements of fair and impartial justice. [The accused’s] 
argument that he felt empowered as a private attorney to conduct the 
same kind of [investigation as a prosecutor] both overstates the inde-
pendence of prosecutorial power and understates the unique restraints 
and oversight on that power.118  
Whether other courts are willing to accept similar distinctions without 
either a formal change in the state ethical rules or as a result of an ethical 
opinion remains unanswered. 
V. JURISDICTIONAL APPROACHES  
“[O]nly a handful of jurisdictions have taken steps to ensure that law en-
forcement attorneys have the legal support to continue the use of deception 
in undercover and other operations involving deception.”119 
To say the least, courts have taken various approaches to the ethical 
questions surrounding the use of undercover work by attorneys. The cases 
turn on state, jurisdiction, the type of practitioner, and the type of case in-
volved. The only thing that is clear in this inquiry is that there is no clarity. 
As outlined by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the rules are ulti-
mately ones of reason.120 As such, it is reasonable for practitioners to de-
mand that this important question be resolved. 
To date, only a limited number of state ethics commissions have ad-
dressed the use of undercover investigations involving or supervised by at-
torneys.121 As expressed by NAAG, “[t]his leaves the vast majority of law 
 
 118. Id. at 378–79. 
 119. Toth, supra note 6, at 7. 
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stated by the Court of Appeals of New York: 
[W]hat is at issue is a disciplinary rule, not a statute. In interpreting statutes, 
which are the enactments of a coequal branch of government and an expression 
of the public policy of this State, we are of course bound to implement the will of 
the Legislature; statutes are to be applied as they are written or interpreted to ef-
fectuate the legislative intention. The disciplinary rules have a different prove-
nance and purpose. Approved by the New York State Bar Association and then 
enacted by the Appellate Divisions, the Code of Professional Responsibility is 
essentially the legal profession’s document of self-governance, embodying prin-
ciples of ethical conduct for attorneys as well as rules for professional discipline. 
While unquestionably important, and respected by the courts, the code does not 
have the force of law. 
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enforcement attorneys across the country uninformed as to whether their 
involvement in undercover operations, directly or indirectly, leaves them 
exposed to ethical complaints.”122 Short of something being done at the na-
tional level with a revision to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
each state, if they wish to do anything at all, would be required to address 
this question independently. As discussed infra, even among those states 
that have already addressed undercover operations, there is no uniformity in 
approach or breadth of protections. 
Following the decision in Gatti, undercover operations by government 
attorneys in Oregon ground to a halt. Indeed, a year after the decision was 
rendered the effects were still being felt. The Washington Post reported: 
“Rather than risk sanction, federal prosecutors stopped signing off on covert 
operations by the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration and other fed-
eral agencies in Oregon a year ago.”123 State and local officials also refused 
involvement in undercover work.124 
In 2002, subsequent to the Gatti decision, Oregon redrafted its equiva-
lent of Rule 4.1. The new rule provides: 
It shall not be professional misconduct for a lawyer to advise clients or 
others about or to supervise lawful covert activity in the investigation of 
violations of civil or criminal law or constitutional rights, provided the 
lawyer’s conduct is otherwise in compliance with these Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct. “Covert activity,” as used in this rule, means an effort to 
obtain information on unlawful activity through the use of misrepresen-
tations or other subterfuge. “Covert activity” may be commenced by a 
lawyer or involve a lawyer as an advisor or supervisor only when the 
lawyer in good faith believes these is a reasonable possibility that unlaw-
ful activity has taken place, is taking place, or will take place in the fu-
ture.125  
Under this Rule, an attorney may oversee undercover activity, but he 
may not undertake any such activity on his own.126 As outlined in a subse-
quent legal opinion, “Oregon RPC 8.4(b) is meant to permit a lawyer only to 
provide advice and supervision regarding covert activity, not to participate 
directly in that activity.”127 
The change made by Oregon is quite broad, allowing undercover work 
in both the criminal and civil setting and by both government and private 
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practitioners. It also appears to provide broad discretion to attorneys in de-
termining whether and how to engage in undercover work. This is apparent 
from the use of the phrase “good faith belief.”128 
Although no judicial decision had been issued in Florida on the ability 
of attorneys to engage in undercover investigations, the state nonetheless 
elected to clarify the scope of its ethical rules to address this topic. In doing 
so, Florida changed its version of Model Rule 4-8.4 to provide, in part: 
A lawyer shall not . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation, except that it shall not be professional mis-
conduct for a lawyer for a criminal law enforcement agency or regulato-
ry agency to advise others about or to supervise another in an undercover 
investigation, unless prohibited by law or rule, and it shall not be profes-
sional misconduct for a lawyer employed in a capacity other than as a 
lawyer by a criminal law enforcement agency or regulatory agency to 
participate in an undercover investigation, unless prohibited by law or 
rule.129  
In the case of Florida, the allowance for lawyers to engage in under-
cover work, either directly or indirectly, is limited to criminal cases or those 
involving a regulatory agency; there is no allowance for civil attorneys, 
whether in government or private practice, to engage in such conduct. 
Virginia has also addressed the use of undercover activities by attor-
neys. Unlike the approach taken by Oregon and Florida, the Virginia change 
was to the state equivalent of Rule 8.4 of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct and not to Rule 4.1. The new language, which is rather subtle in 
wording, simply provides: “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . 
engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation 
which reflects adversely on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law.”130 In the 
mind of practitioners, this change provided little, if any, additional guidance. 
One attorney, employed by an unnamed federal intelligence agency, 
accordingly sought clarification as to the impact of this rule change on un-
dercover work conducted or supervised by attorneys. In response to this 
attorney request, the Virginia State Bar Standing Committee on Legal Ethics 
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issued Legal Ethics Opinion 1765.131 In this opinion, the Virginia Commit-
tee affirmed the use of undercover activities by government lawyers, stating: 
[T]he committee opines that when an attorney employed by the federal 
government uses lawful methods, such as the use of “alias identities” and 
non-consensual tape-recording, as part of his intelligence or covert activ-
ities, those methods cannot be seen as reflecting adversely on his fitness 
to practice law; therefore, such conduct will not violate the prohibition in 
Rule 8.4(c).132 
The Virginia Committee further affirmed the reasoning that it adopted 
years before in Legal Ethics Opinion 1738, dealing with discrimination test-
ers employed by government agencies.133 By Opinion 1738, the committee 
found: 
[T]he conduct of undercover investigators and discrimination testers act-
ing under the direction of an attorney involves deception and deceit. The 
conduct about which you have inquired arises in the context where in-
formation would not be available by other means and without which an 
important and judicially-sanctioned social policy would be frustrated. 
These methods of gathering information in the course of investigating 
crimes or testing for discrimination are legal, long-established and wide-
ly used for socially desirable ends.134 
Appropriately, the Virginia Committee determined that “Rule 8.4 does 
not prohibit a lawyer engaged in a criminal investigation or a housing dis-
crimination investigation from making otherwise lawful misrepresentations 
necessary to conduct such investigations.”135 Despite the apparent breadth of 
these determinations, language exists in Opinion 1765 that may, nonethe-
less, limit the decisions to government lawyers.136 When comparing the use 
of discrimination testers to undercover police work, the Virginia Committee 
noted that there was “no reason to distinguish, for purposes of permissibility 
of investigative techniques under the Rules of Professional Conduct, be-
tween the activities of these two groups of government attorneys.”137 
Although limiting the scope of its rule to prosecuting attorneys, Ala-
bama has also amended its Rules of Professional Conduct to address the use 
of covert activity. Alabama’s change was to Rule 3.8, which deals with the 
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special responsibilities conferred on prosecutors.138 The amended rule makes 
clear that a “prosecutor, through orders, directions, advice, and encourage-
ment, may cause other agencies and offices of government, and may cause 
non-lawyers employed or retained by or associated with the prosecutor, to 
engage in any action that is not prohibited by law.”139 As explained in the 
comments to Rule 3.8: 
[I]n undercover and sting operations, the making of false statements is 
the essence of the activity. The prosecutor is prohibited by Rule 4.1(a) 
from making false statements and is prohibited by Rule 8.4(a) from 
knowingly assisting or inducing another to violate the Rules. In order to 
make clear that the prosecutor may cause the government to act in the 
fight against crime to the fullest extent permitted to the government by 
existing law, paragraph (2)(a) makes clear that the prosecutor may order, 
direct, encourage and advise with respect to any lawful government ac-
tion.140 
Where, however, the Rules of Professional Conduct specifically pro-
hibit certain conduct, such as communications between an attorney and a 
represented party, a prosecutor remains subject to the prohibition.141 
The District of Columbia’s Bar Legal Ethics Committee (the “D.C. 
Committee”) addressed the ethical issues associated with the use of under-
cover work by attorneys through an ethics opinion, as opposed to an 
amendment to the Rules of Professional Conduct.142 Opinion 323 specifical-
ly related to “whether attorneys who are employed by a national intelligence 
agency violate the Rules of Professional Conduct if they engage in fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation in the course of their non-representational offi-
cial duties.”143 It was determined that these activities did not fall within the 
scope of Rule 8.4. This decision was based upon three factors.144 
First, the D.C. Committee found that Rule 8.4 was limited to conduct 
that reflected an attorney’s fitness to practice law.145 The Rule was not 
meant to “include misrepresentations made in the course of official conduct 
as an employee of an agency of the United States if the attorney reasonably 
believes that the conduct in question is authorized by law.”146 Next, the D.C. 
Committee noted that the Rules of Professional Conduct had previously 
been interpreted by the District of Columbia Bar to permit “lawful law en-
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forcement activity.”147 Finally, the Rules of Professional Conduct were de-
termined to be, per their own language, rules of reason.148 “We do not 
think,” the Bar stated, “that the Rules of Professional Conduct require law-
yers to choose between their personal safety or compliance with the law, on 
the one hand, and maintenance of their bar licenses, on the other.”149 Opin-
ion 323 ultimately concluded: 
Lawyers employed by government agencies who act in a non-
representational official capacity in a manner they reasonably believe to 
be authorized by law do not violate Rule 8.4 if, in the course of their em-
ployment, they make misrepresentations that are reasonably intended to 
further the conduct of their official duties.150 
The decision of the District of Columbia Bar appears to limit the use of 
covert or undercover activity to those working for national security or intel-
ligence services; in a footnote, the Bar concluded that the Opinion was not 
intended to apply to those attorneys who were working on behalf of a cli-
ent.151 
The Utah Committee also issued an opinion examining the use of un-
dercover work by attorneys.152 In Opinion 02-05, the Utah Committee de-
termined that the Rules of Professional Conduct did not prohibit such con-
duct by government lawyers; 
[W]e do not believe that [the] rule was intended to prohibit prosecutors 
or other governmental lawyers from participating in lawful undercover 
investigations. Nor do we think a distinction should be drawn between 
prosecutors or other governmental lawyers who supervise the investiga-
tive activities of others and those who take part directly in such activi-
ties. We hold that as long a prosecutor’s or other governmental lawyer’s 
conduct employing dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation is part 
of an otherwise lawful government operation, the prosecutor or other 
governmental lawyer does not violate Rule 8.4(c).153 
Utah has, thus, permitted the use of undercover operations by govern-
ment lawyers, but not those who are engaged in private practice or who act 
on behalf of a public interest organization. 
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Iowa neither amended its Rules of Professional Conduct nor issued an 
advisory opinion; instead, it addressed the issue by way of a comment to 
Rule 8.4.154 In this comment, it was made clear that attorneys, of all types, 
could engage in covert activity: 
It is not professional misconduct for a lawyer to advise clients or others 
about or to supervise or participate in lawful covert activity in the inves-
tigation of violations of civil or criminal law or constitutional rights or in 
lawful intelligence-gathering activity, provided the lawyer’s conduct is 
otherwise in compliance with these rules.155 
The only limitation on the right to engage in subterfuge as part of an 
investigation is the good faith belief that “unlawful activity has taken place, 
is taking place, or will take place in the foreseeable future.”156 The allow-
ance in Iowa is nearly identical, in both wording and scope, to the amended 
rule adopted by Oregon following the decision in Gatti. 
Although not binding authority, the New York County Law Associa-
tion (“NYCLA”) has also issued an opinion to its members concerning the 
use of “dissemblance” by investigators in the employ of attorneys.157 The 
term “dissemblance,” for purposes of Opinion 737, was specifically limited 
to “misstatements as to identity and purpose made solely for gathering evi-
dence.”158 After analyzing the myriad of decisions made on this topic by 
professional responsibility and bar associations around the country, the 
NYCLA concluded: 
Non-government attorneys may . . . in our view ethically supervise non-
attorney investigators employing a limited amount of dissemblance in 
some strictly limited circumstances where: (i) either (a) the investigation 
is of a violation of civil rights or intellectual property rights and the law-
yer believes in good faith that such violation is taking place or will take 
place imminently or (b) the dissemblance is expressly authorized by law; 
and (ii) the evidence sought is not reasonably available through other 
lawful means; and (iii) the lawyer’s conduct and the investigator’s con-
duct that the lawyer is supervising do not otherwise violate the Code [of 
Professional Conduct] . . . or applicable law; and (iv) the dissemblance 
does not unlawfully or unethically violate the rights of third parties.159 
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The opinion was not intended to address either the use of dissemblance 
by government lawyers or its use by attorneys not working in conjunction 
with an investigator.160 
Two years later in 2009, the Philadelphia Bar Association also issued 
an opinion related to the use of ruses by investigators who are acting on be-
half of attorneys.161 Opinion 2009-02 specifically dealt with the question of 
whether an investigator could send a “friend” request to a witness to deter-
mine whether their Facebook or MySpace accounts contained evidence re-
lated to a case.162 The Philadelphia Bar Association said that this practice 
was, under Rule 8.4, unethical.163 The use of an investigator in this scenario, 
the association reasoned, omits a highly material fact: “[T]he third party 
who asks to be allowed access to the witness’s pages is doing so only be-
cause he or she is intent on obtaining information and sharing it with a law-
yer for use in a lawsuit to impeach the testimony of the witness.”164 The as-
sociation further stated: 
”The fact that the inquirer asserts he does not know if the witness would 
permit him if he simply asked in a forthright fashion does not remove the 
deception. The inquirer could test that by simply asking the witness 
forthrightly for access. That would not be deceptive and would of course 
be permissible.”165  
The opinion of the Philadelphia Bar Association does not distinguish 
between either the type of case involved, or the employ of the attorney.166 
Finally, Vermont has raised questions regarding the ethical use of sub-
terfuge by attorneys. In re PRB Docket No. 2007-046 involved the issue of 
secretly taped recordings of witness interviews.167 Although not directly 
relevant to that question, the Supreme Court of Vermont also asked the 
United States Attorney, the Attorney General of Vermont, the Defender 
General, and Office of Disciplinary Counsel to brief issues “concerning the 
existence and scope of exceptions to Rules 4.1 and 8.4(c) for prosecuting 
attorneys and defense attorneys in criminal matters.”168 Although the Court 
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 167. In re PRB Docket No. 2007-046, 989 A.2d 523 (Vt. 2009). 
 168. Id. at 530. 
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ultimately deferred the issue to a separate committee for consideration, it 
noted that: 
[T]here may be circumstances in which misrepresentations that facially 
violate the rules are useful, perhaps even necessary, to the functioning of 
the law-enforcement and judicial systems. Attorneys general and state’s 
attorneys, as part of that system, may employ such methods themselves, 
or may direct others to employ them, as they investigate discrimination, 
consumer fraud, or other crimes.169 
To date, the newly formulated Vermont Committee has not issued any 
public decision on this matter. 
As outlined herein, while a number of jurisdictions, committees, and 
associations have addressed the use of subterfuge by attorneys, the vast ma-
jority, including Arkansas, have not. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 “There is . . . a need for adaptation of the ethics rules in the Model Rules to 
the Attorney General and his staff in recognition of the uniqueness of the 
office, the Attorney General’s obligation to protect the public interest, and 
the Attorney General’s statutory obligation to represent the various and 
sometimes conflicting interests of numerous state agencies.”170 
Arkansas has no authority, whether in the form of rule, opinion, or 
comment, as to an attorney’s ability to be directly or indirectly involved in 
undercover operations involving the use of deceit. The time has come for 
this important issue to be addressed. The Court of Appeals of Arkansas has 
previously stated that “[t]here is . . . a need for adaptation of the ethics rules 
in the Model Rules to the Attorney General and his staff.”171 The same could 
also be said for other government organizations in the state: whether police 
agencies, prosecutor offices, or state agencies, boards, and commissions. 
Private practitioners and those lawyers working in the public interest field 
also have an interest in this topic. 
In any decision on this matter, important policy questions will need to 
be addressed. At a minimum, the following will need to be considered: 
Should attorneys be permitted to directly engage in subterfuge as to identity 
and purpose as part of case-related investigations? Should attorneys be able 
to supervise and advise others engaging in such activities? If permitted, 
should this allowance be extended to both criminal and civil matters? 
 
 169. Id. 
 170. Holloway v. Ark. State Bd. of Architects, 79 Ark. App. 200, 215, 86 S.W.3d 391, 
400 (2002). 
 171. Id. 
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Should these tactics be open to attorneys in private practice and public inter-
est organizations, as well as government lawyers? Should attorneys be given 
great deference in their ability to use these tactics, as in Oregon under Opin-
ion 2005-173, or should their employment be limited, as advised by the 
NYCLA in Opinion 737? 
Ultimately, these issues will be decided by the courts, the Arkansas 
Committee on Professional Conduct, or the Arkansas Bar Association. De-
spite this, public policy seems to dictate that, at a minimum, government 
attorneys, whether operating in the criminal or civil system, be permitted to 
engage in covert activity to enforce the law and protect the public-at-large. 
As expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States in Hoffa, “[t]here 
are some situations where the law could not adequately be enforced without 
the employment of some guile or misrepresentation of identity.”172 The mer-
its of this conclusion cannot be argued. 
In the criminal setting, the need for such operations is obvious. Indeed, 
undercover police work often presents the best opportunity to catch those 
intent on breaking the law. For example, if a uniformed officer asked to buy 
a kilo of cocaine from a drug dealer, would the transaction actually take 
place? Would a known detective be permitted to infiltrate a dangerous crim-
inal organization? The answers are, without any doubt, “no.” Ultimately, 
any limitation on the ability of federal or state law enforcement agencies to 
use subterfuge as a means of policing would serve only to damage, and not 
promote, justice. 
The need for government attorneys to use guile in the civil realm is 
equally clear. Recognizing the need to protect consumers from unconscion-
able, false, or deceptive acts, the Arkansas General Assembly specifically 
provided the Consumer Protection Division with the ability to conduct in-
vestigations into unlawful activities.173 As recognized by courts around the 
nation: “[U]ndercover investigators provide an effective enforcement mech-
anism for detecting and proving anti-competitive activity which might oth-
erwise escape discovery or proof.”174 Any decision relating to the ethical use 
of undercover operations involving attorneys should take these matters into 
account. 
Until questions relating to attorney use of subterfuge are addressed and 
this issue is decided, all attorneys practicing in this state, whether public or 
private, run the risk of violating the Rules. Their involvement in undercover 
operations, either directly or indirectly, could have dire consequences. At-
 
 172. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 315 (1966). 
 173. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-105(d)(3) (2013). 
 174. Gidatex, S.r.L. v. Campaniello Imports, Ltd., 82 F.Supp.2d 119, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999). 
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torneys are, thus, advised to carefully consider this issue to determine 
whether the risk of such a practice is worth the reward it may bring. 
